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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TRADING VOTES FOR VOTES. A DYNAMIC THEORY
ALESSANDRA CASELLA
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THOMAS PALFREY
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We develop a framework to study the dynamics of vote trading over multiple binary
issues. We prove that there always exists a stable allocation of votes that is reachable in
a finite number of trades, for any number of voters and issues, any separable preference
profile, and any restrictions on the coalitions that may form. If at every step all blocking
trades are chosen with positive probability, convergence to a stable allocation occurs in
finite time with probability 1. If coalitions are unrestricted, the outcome of vote trading
must be Pareto optimal, but unless there are three voters or two issues, it need not
correspond to the Condorcet winner.
KEYWORDS: Voting, vote trading, Condorcet winner, stability.
1. INTRODUCTION
EXCHANGING ONE’S SUPPORT of a proposal for someone else’s support of a different
proposal is common practice in group decision-making. Whether in small informal com-
mittees or in legislatures, common sense, anecdotes, and systematic evidence all suggest
that vote trading is a routine component of collective decisions.1 Vote trading is ubiqui-
tous, and yet its theoretical properties are not well understood. Efforts at a theory were
numerous and enthusiastic in the 1960s and 1970s, but fizzled and have almost entirely
disappeared in the last 40 years. John Ferejohn’s words in 1974, towards the end of this
wave of research, remain true today: “[W]e really know very little theoretically about vote
trading. We cannot be sure about when it will occur, or how often, or what sort of bargains
will be made. We don’t know if it has any desirable normative or efficiency properties.”
(Ferejohn (1974, p. 25))
One reason for the lack of progress is that the problem is difficult: each vote trade
occurs without the equilibrating properties of a continuous price mechanism, causes ex-
ternalities to allies and opponents of the trading parties, and can trigger new profitable
exchanges. As a subset of voters trade votes on a set of proposals, the default outcomes
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of these proposals change in response to the reallocation of votes, generating incentives
for a new round of vote trades, which will again change outcomes and open new trading
possibilities. A second reason for the early difficulties is that a consistent well-defined
framework was missing. Most authors left unspecified some crucial details of their mod-
els, used an array of different assumptions and terminology, at times implicit, and never
fully closed the loop between the definition of stability and the specification of the trad-
ing rule. The first contribution of this paper is the development of a general theoretical
framework for analyzing vote trading as a sequential dynamic process.
The voting environment is composed of an odd number of voters facing several binary
proposals, each of which will either pass or fail. Every committee member can be in favor
or opposed to any proposal. Preferences are represented by intensities over winning any
individual proposal and are additively separable across proposals, inducing for each voter
an ordering over all possible outcomes—that is, all combinations of different proposals
passing or failing.
An initial allocation of votes specifies how many votes each voter controls on each pro-
posal. After vote trades are concluded, each proposal is decided by majority rule: if, after
trading, the number of votes controlled by voters favoring a proposal exceeds the number
of votes controlled by voters opposing a proposal, then the proposal passes; otherwise, it
fails.
Votes are tradable, in the sense of a barter market. A vote trade is a reallocation of
votes held by a subset, or coalition, of voters. Hence the dynamic process operates on the
set of feasible vote allocations, and the current state of the dynamic system corresponds
to the current allocation of votes. We specify a family of simple algorithms, called Pivot
algorithms, according to which trading evolves over time. Dynamic sequences of vote
trades are executed by sequences of blocking coalitions—subsets of voters who, given
the allocation of votes, can reallocate votes among themselves and reach a new outcome
each of them strictly prefers to the pre-trade outcome. Both the coalition and the trade
are fully unconstrained: the coalition can be of any size, and each member can trade as
many votes as she wishes on as many proposals as desired; trades need not be one-to-
one. The only requirement is that all members of a blocking coalition must strictly gain
from the trade. If the initial vote allocation is not blocked by any coalition, it is stable,
and there is no trade. However, if the allocation is blocked, it may be blocked by many
different coalitions and many different trades. An element of our family of algorithms
is any rule selecting blocking coalitions and trades at each blocked allocation. The trade
produces a new allocation of votes, and the algorithm again selects a blocking coalition
and a trade. The algorithm continues until a vote allocation is reached from which there
are no improving trades for any coalition. Such vote allocation is called Pivot stable.
The approach delivers three main results, addressing some of the open questions left
from the older literature. Our first key result is a general existence theorem. The set of
Pivot stable vote allocations is non-empty. For any initial vote allocation, any number of
voters or proposals, any profile of preference rankings, any restriction on feasible blocking
coalitions, there always exists a finite sequence of trades that ends at a stable allocation.
The existence result does not rule out the possibility that some selection rules may gen-
erate cycles. However, if every blocking trade is selected with positive probability, then
trade must converge to a Pivot stable vote allocation in finite time with probability 1. Fur-
thermore, if trades are restricted to be pairwise and non-redundant, that is, if votes that
do not affect outcomes are not traded, then trading converges to a stable allocation along
all possible sequences of blocking trades. Earlier conjectures (Riker and Brams (1973),
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Ferejohn (1974)) speculated that vote trading could reach a stable allocation only un-
der very strict conditions on the number and types of trades, and in particular ruling out
coalitional trades. Our results show otherwise: a stable allocation is always reachable.
Every vote allocation produces an outcome, that is, a specific combination of proposals
passing or failing. Our second result concerns the optimality of Pivot stable allocations,
and serves as a welfare theorem to complement the existence theorem. Pivot stable vote
allocations always generate Pareto optimal outcomes if no restrictions are placed on the
set of blocking coalitions. Together with our existence result, we can then conclude that
vote trading can always deliver a stable Pareto optimal outcome.
The early literature was inspired in large part by a claim, stated explicitly in Buchanan
and Tullock (1962), that vote trading must lead to Pareto superior outcomes because it
allows the expression of voters’ intensity of preferences.2 The conjecture was rejected by
Riker and Brams’s (1973) influential “paradox of vote trading” which showed that when
trade is restricted to be pairwise, Pareto-inferior outcomes are possible. The belief that
constraining trade to be pairwise was necessary to achieve stability made the conclusion
particularly important. Our result is consistent with Riker and Brams’s paradox because
restrictions on the allowable set of blocking coalitions can lead to suboptimal allocations.
But the general existence of Pareto optimal outcomes reached via trade when coalitions
are unconstrained leaves room for a more optimistic perspective.
A criterion more demanding than Pareto optimality is the correspondence between
outcomes generated by Pivot stable vote allocations and the Condorcet winner—the out-
come that a majority of voters prefer to any other—if it exists. We analyze such a cor-
respondence, called Condorcet consistency in the social choice literature,3 in our third
set of results. In general, Pivot trading is not Condorcet consistent: even when the Con-
dorcet winner exists, trading may lead to a stable outcome that differs from the Condorcet
winner. Special cases exist—for example, if there are only three voters, or two proposals—
such that vote trading is guaranteed to deliver the Condorcet winner, but the result does
not hold more broadly. The connection between outcomes generated by Pivot stable allo-
cations and the Condorcet winner thus is tenuous: we know that the former always exist
while the latter typically does not, and even when the latter exists, vote trading need not
deliver it.
The link between vote trading and the Condorcet winner was a central unresolved ques-
tion in the early literature. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Coleman (1966) conjectured
that vote trading offers the solution to majority cycles in the absence of a Condorcet
winner, a belief we find still expressed in popular writings on voting.4 Starting with Park
(1967), a number of authors studied and rejected the conjecture,5 but the different scenar-
ios and the incompletely specified trading rules make comparisons difficult. Our existence
result can be read as partially supporting Buchanan and Tullock’s, and Coleman’s conjec-
ture. But the connection is weak because the logic in the older arguments seems quite
different and, contrary to the implicit claims of all authors cited above, existence of a
Condorcet winner in general does not imply that it must be reached by vote trading.
2The claim originated in an early debate between Gordon Tullock and Anthony Downs (Tullock (1959,
1961), Downs (1957, 1961)). See also Coleman (1966), Haefele (1971), Tullock (1970), and Wilson (1969).
3See Moulin (1988).
4“If logrolling is the norm, then the problem of the cyclical majority vanishes.” (Buchanan and Tullock
(1962, p. 330)). “When logrolling is allowed, the highest valued outcome is secure without the threat of a
cyclical majority.” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logrolling, accessed June 20, 2018).
5See also Bernholz (1973), Ferejohn (1974), Koehler (1975), Schwartz (1975), Kadane (1972), Miller (1977).
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As our description makes clear, the object of our study is the trade of votes for votes
within a committee, in the absence of side-payments. Thus, the model and the approach
are quite different from the rich literature analyzing the trade of votes in exchange for a
numeraire, whether vote buying by candidates or lobbyists (Myerson (1993), Groseclose
and Snyder (1996), Dal Bo (2007), Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky (2008, 2009)), or vote
markets (Philipson and Snyder (1996), Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey (2012), Xef-
teris and Ziros (2017)), or auction-like mechanisms (Lalley and Weyl (2016), Goeree and
Zhang (2017)).
The lack of side-payments evokes instead the work on alternative voting rules that al-
low outcomes to reflect intensity of preferences. The literature includes the storable votes
mechanism of Casella (2005), qualitative voting (Hortala-Vallve (2012)), and the linking
mechanisms proposed in Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007). There are, however, two ma-
jor differences. First, in these schemes, voters can shift their own votes from one proposal
to another, within the limits of a budget constraint, but are not allowed to trade votes
with other voters. Second, such mechanisms are formulated as solutions to Bayesian col-
lective decision problems, where preference intensity is represented by von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility functions. The approach and solution concepts are grounded in non-
cooperative game theory and agents maximize expected utility. Neither feature applies
to our analysis, where votes can be traded across voters but not across proposals, and
representation of preferences that maintain ordinal rankings are fully interchangeable.
In terms of solution concepts, this paper is connected to work on dynamics and sta-
bility in environments that do not allow side-payments. We have in mind the problem of
achieving stability in sequential rounds of matching among different agents (Gale and
Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Roth and Vande Vate (1990)), in creating or
deleting links in the formation of networks (Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Watts (2001),
Jackson and Watts (2002)), or in sequences of barter trades in an exchange economy with-
out money (Feldman (1973, 1974), Green (1974)). While the substantive issues addressed
in those papers are different from vote trading, the modeling of dynamics and stability is
similar in spirit to ours. In all of these cases, as in the approach we take in this paper, the
problem is studied by combining a definition of stability and a rule specifying the dynamic
process leading to stable outcomes.
In what follows, we begin by describing the general framework (Section 2). In Sec-
tion 3, we discuss the existence of stable vote allocations reachable via trading, and their
properties—the Pareto optimality of stable vote allocations and the relationship between
stable outcomes and the Condorcet winner. Section 4 summarizes our conclusions and
discusses possible directions of future research.
2. THE MODEL
Consider a committee C = {1    N} of N (odd) voters who must approve or re-
ject each of K independent binary proposals. The set of proposals is denoted P =
{1    k    K}. Committee members have separable preferences represented by a pro-
file of values, z, where zki ∈ R is the value attached by member i to the approval of pro-
posal k, or the utility i experiences if k passes. Value zki is positive if i is in favor of k
and negative if i is opposed. The value of any proposal failing is normalized to 0. We
call xki ≡ |zki | voter i’s intensity on proposal k. We specify the profile of cardinal values z
because working with such a profile will prove convenient and intuitive, but our analysis
relies only on individual ordinal rankings over the 2K possible outcomes (all possible com-
binations of passing and failing for each proposal). Proposals are voted upon one-by-one,
and each proposal k is decided through simple majority voting.
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Before voting takes place, committee members can trade votes. One can think of votes
in our model as if they were physical ballots, each one tagged by proposal. A vote trade is
an exchange of ballots, with no enforcement or credibility problem. After trading, a voter
may own zero votes over some proposals and several votes over others, but cannot hold
negative votes on any issue. We call vki the votes held by voter i over proposal k, vi =
(v1i      v
K
i ) the profile of votes held by i over all proposals, and v = (v1     vi     vN)
a vote allocation, that is, a profile of vote holdings for all voters and proposals. The initial
vote allocation is denoted by v0 = (v01     v0N). We impose no restriction on v0, beyond
vk0i ≥ 0 for all i, k and, to avoid ties,
∑
i v
k
0i odd for all k. Let V denote the set of feasible
vote allocations: v ∈ V ⇐⇒∑i vki =∑i vk0i for all k and vki ≥ 0 for all i, k.6
DEFINITION 1: A trade is an ordered pair of vote allocations (v v′), such that v v′ ∈ V
and v = v′.
That is, the trade (v v′) is a reallocation of votes from v to v′. Voter i’s net trade from
(v v′) is denoted δi(v v′), where δki (v v
′)= v′ki − vki .
Given a feasible vote allocation v, when voting takes place on proposal k each voter
has a dominant strategy to cast all her votes in favor of the proposal if her proposal’s
value is positive (zki > 0), and against the proposal if her proposal’s value is negative
(zki < 0). We indicate by P(v)⊆ P the set of proposals that receive at least (
∑
i v
k
0i + 1)/2
favorable votes, and therefore pass. We call P(v) the outcome of the vote if voting occurs
at allocation v. Finally, we define ui(v) as the utility of voter i if voting occurs at v: ui(v)=∑
k∈P(v) z
k
i . Preferences over outcomes are assumed to be strict. That is, ui(v) = ui(v′) if
and only if P(v)= P(v′).7
Our focus is on the existence and properties of vote allocations that hold no incentives
for trading. Without loss of generality, we will assume that there are no unanimous issues,
that is, there is no issue k such that either zki > 0 for all i or z
k
i < 0 for all i.
8 Consider any
trade (v v′), and let ki (v v
′)= |δki (v v′)| denote the absolute change in vote holdings for
individual i on proposal k. Denote i(v v′)=∑Kk=1 ki (v v′). We define the following:
DEFINITION 2: Let C ⊆ C be a non-empty coalition. The trade (v v′) is a payoff-
improving trade for C if i ∈ C ⇔ i(v v′) > 0 and i ∈ C ⇒ ui(v′) > ui(v).
That is, a trade is called payoff-improving for C if only voters in C, and all voters in C,
trade, and every voter in C is strictly better off with the outcome that would result from
the new vote allocation. Coalition C can have any arbitrary size between 2 and N . We
then say the following:
DEFINITION 3: A coalition C ⊆ C blocks v if there exists a payoff-improving trade
(v v′) for C. Call (v v′) a blocking trade.
We denote by B(v) the set of all blocking trades at v—that is, the set of all feasible
payoff-improving trades for all possible coalitions.
6Note that
∑
k v
k
i =
∑
k v
k
0i is feasible because we do not restrict trades to be one-to-one.
7For any i, strictness is satisfied for all zi , except for a set of measure zero. Some of the examples considered
later in the paper allow voters to have weak preferences. This is done for expositional clarity only, and the
examples are easily modified to strict preferences.
8Exchanging votes on a unanimous issue can never change the outcome.
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DEFINITION 4: A vote allocation v ∈ V is stable if B(v)= ∅.
Our definition of stability thus coincides with the core: a vote allocation v ∈ V is stable
if it belongs in the core. Note that for any N , K, and z, the core is not empty: a feasible
allocation of votes where a single voter i holds a majority of votes on every issue is always
in the core and thus is trivially stable: no exchange of votes involving voter i can make i
strictly better off; and no exchange of votes that does not involve voter i can make anyone
else strictly better off. Hence, the following holds:
PROPOSITION 1: A stable vote allocation v exists for all z, N , and K.
2.1. Dynamic Adjustment: Pivot Algorithms
Stable vote allocations exist, but are they reachable through sequential decentralized
exchange? To answer the question, we need to specify the dynamic process through which
trades take place.
We posit a dynamic process characterized by sequences of trades yielding myopic strict
gains to all coalition members:
DEFINITION 5: A Pivot algorithm is any mechanism generating a sequence of trades as
follows: Start from the initial vote allocation v0. If there is no blocking trade, stop. If there
is one such trade, execute it. If there are multiple such trades, execute one according to a
choice rule R. Continue in this fashion until no further blocking trade exists.
The definition describes a family of algorithms, and individual algorithms differ in the
specification of the choice rule R that is applied when multiple blocking trades are possi-
ble. For example, R may select each possible trade with equal probability; or give priority
to trades with higher total gains or involving fewer, or more numerous, or specific voters.
Rule R can depend on the current allocation or history of votes, and can be stochastic.
Formally, R specifies a probability distribution over B(v), for each vote allocation v such
that B(v) = ∅. For any B(v) = ∅ and for any (v v′) ∈ B(v), we denote by R(vv′)≥ 0 the
probability that (v v′) is selected at v, with
∑
(vv′)∈B(v) R(v v
′) = 1. Note that R selects a
trade, hence both a coalition and a specific exchange of votes for that coalition, among
all possible coalitions and vote exchanges that are strictly payoff-improving for the voters
involved in the trade.
Payoff-improving trades are not restricted to two proposals only, nor to exchanging one
vote for one vote: a voter can trade her vote or bundles of votes on one or more issues, in
exchange for other voters’ vote or votes on one or more issues, or in fact in exchange for
no other votes. The only restriction we are imposing is that the trades be strictly payoff-
improving for all traders. If a trade is payoff-improving, it is a legitimate trade under the
Pivot algorithms.
The name Pivot algorithm comes from an observation due to Riker and Brams (1973):
if a trade is strictly payoff-improving, it must alter the outcome of the vote; hence it must
involve pivotal votes. In the broad definition we are using here, not all traded votes need
to be pivotal: as long as some are, and the outcome is modified by the trade in a direction
that benefits all members of the trading coalition, redundant votes may be traded, too.
Redundant votes are votes whose trade does not affect the outcome: votes traded between
voters on the same side of an issue, or votes traded between voters on opposite sides, but
not sufficient to change which side holds a majority. Their trade is irrelevant to myopic
payoffs but can affect the path of future trades by altering the blocking possibilities of
different future coalitions.
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3. PIVOT-STABLE VOTE ALLOCATIONS: EXISTENCE AND PROPERTIES
Do Pivot algorithms converge to stable vote allocations? Stated differently, do sequen-
tial myopic trades converge to the core? The question is not trivial because any Pivot
trade changes default outcomes and alters the existing set of blocking trades, potentially
leading to new Pivot trades, in a sequence that, in principle, could result in a perennial
cycle.
3.1. Existence
We define the following:
DEFINITION 6: An allocation of votes v is Pivot-stable if it is stable and reachable from
v0 through a Pivot algorithm in a finite number of steps.
The following result establishes the general existence of Pivot-stable vote allocations:
THEOREM 1: A Pivot-stable allocation of votes exists for all v0, K, N , and z.
Before presenting a formal proof of the theorem, it is useful to first explain the intuition
with an example.
EXAMPLE 1: Consider the value matrix in Table I: rows represent proposals, columns
represent voters, and the entry in each cell is zki , the value attached by voter i to proposal
k passing. (Recall that the value of a failed proposal is normalized to zero for all voters.)
Suppose v0 = (11    1). At v0, proposals A and B both pass with a vote of 3 − 2:
u1(v0) = u2(v0) = 1, u3(v0) = u4(v0) = −1, u5(v0) = 3. Allocation v0 is not stable: it can
be blocked by voters 3 and 4. Voter 3 gives a B vote to 4, in exchange for an A vote,
reaching a new vote allocation v1 = ((11) (11) (20) (02) (11)). At v1, both pro-
posals fail, and u3(v1)= u4(v1)= 0, a strict payoff improvement for voters 3 and 4. Voters
3 and 4 have shifted votes away from a lower value proposal each was, pre-trade, winning
towards a higher value proposal each was losing. The difference in values is the key to
the payoff-improving nature of the trade. Vote allocation v1 is not stable either. Voters 1
and 2 can block it: voter 1 can trade her B vote to 2 in exchange for an A vote, reach-
ing allocation v2 = ((20) (02) (20) (02) (11)), such that both proposals pass, and
u1(v2) = u2(v2) = 1, a strict payoff improvement for 1 and 2 over allocation v1. Again,
the logic of the trade is a shift in votes from low-value proposals the voters were winning
pre-trade to higher value proposals the voters were losing. Allocation v2 is stable.
TABLE I
VALUE MATRIX FOR EXAMPLE 1
1 2 3 4 5
A 2 −1 −2 1 1
B −1 2 1 −2 2
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Over the sequence of trades, the voters’ myopic payoffs have moved non-monotonically,
falling and then rising for voters 1, 2, and 5, rising and then falling for voters 3 and 4. The
changes in payoffs reflect both the direct gains from the trades the voters themselves have
executed and the externalities caused by others’ trades. The number of votes held on each
proposal, on the other hand, is affected only by the trades a voter participates in. At each
step of the process, we can construct an index of the total potential value of each voter’s
vote holdings, independently of the voting outcome. Specifically, let this index be defined
as the intensity-weighted sum of i’s votes—here xAi v
A
i + xBi vBi , and call it i’s score at v.9
Voter i’s score does not change when i does not trade (by construction) and, at least
in this example, increases whenever i does trade: after the first trade, it rises from 3 to 4
for voters 3 and 4 (the two voters who trade); after the second trade, it rises, again from
3 to 4, for voters 1 and 2. The increases reflect the logic of the payoff-improving trades.
But note that for each voter, the index has a finite ceiling. In this example, the ceiling
is 5(xAi + xBi ), where 5 is the total number of existing votes on each issue. Thus, if each
voter’s score can only move monotonically upwards, trade must end in finite time.
What complicates the proof of Theorem 1 is that, unfortunately, the simple monotonic-
ity of the example does not extend to the general case. If multiple votes are given away on
the same proposal, if trades involve more than two voters, if some of the votes traded are
redundant, in all of these cases traders in payoff-improving trades may see their scores
decline. Consider Example 2:
EXAMPLE 2: The value matrix is reported in Table II. As before, rows represent pro-
posals, columns represent voters, and the entry in each cell is zki , the value attached by
voter i to proposal k passing.
At v, voter 1 has one vote on A and two votes on B; voter 2 has one vote on A and zero
votes on B, and voter 3 has one vote on each proposal. Without trade, A fails 2-1 and B
fails 3-0. But v is not stable: voters 1 and 2 are a blocking coalition. Voter 1 trades both
of her B votes to voter 2 in exchange for voter 2’s A vote; in the resulting allocation v′,
both A and B pass 2-1, and u1(v′)= u2(v′)= 1, a strict improvement for both voters over
u1(v)= u2(v)= 0. Nevertheless, voter 1’s score falls from 13 to 10. There is no alternative
trade that benefits all members of a trading coalition, and thus there is no trade such that
voter 1’s score does not fall.
It turns out, however, that the main intuition is robust. The simple fact that all voters
taking part in a trade must strictly gain from the trade is sufficient to guarantee that
TABLE II
AN EXAMPLE WHERE THE ONLY EXISTING BLOCKING
TRADE CAUSES A DECLINE IN SCORE FOR VOTER 1a
1 2 3
A 5 −1 −1
B −4 2 −1
aVote allocations are ((12) (10) (11)).
9One can see that separability is essential to the construction, as the score function is only well-defined with
separable preferences.
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there always exists a path of trades such that any voter’s score can decline at most a finite
number of times. But then, since the score is bounded, trade must end in finite time. The
proof of Theorem 1 defines a general algorithm for constructing such a path for arbitrary
environments.
The proof proceeds in two steps. We begin by side-stepping the complication illustrated
in Example 2: Lemma 1 shows that if every blocking trade changes outcomes only on
proposals that win or lose by exactly one vote, then, for every blocking coalition C and
for every i ∈ C, there always exists a blocking trade for C that is score-improving for i.
The second part of the proof then expands the environment to arbitrary v, allowing for
blocking trades in which multiple votes may be traded away.
Before describing the proof, two additional definitions are useful. First, the index used
in Example 1 should be defined formally:
DEFINITION 7: Consider voter i and a vote allocation v. Voter i’s score at v is given by
σi(v)=
K∑
k=1
xki v
k
i 
Second, Lemma 1 applies to blocking trades on proposals decided by a single vote. This,
too, should be made precise.
DEFINITION 8: Call Nk+ the set of voters in favor of proposal k, and N
k
− the set of
voters against proposal k. We say that, at v, a proposal is decided by minimal majority if
|∑i∈Nk+ vki −∑i∈Nk− vki | = 1.
LEMMA 1: Suppose that, at v, every blocking trade (v v′) changes outcomes only on pro-
posals that are decided by minimal majority at v. Then, for any C that blocks v and for any
i ∈C, there exists a blocking trade, (v v′), such that σi(v′) > σi(v).
PROOF: The proof is constructive. If v is stable, there are no blocking trades. Suppose
then that v is not stable and there is at least one blocking coalition; if there is more than
one, select any blocking coalition C. Because C is a blocking coalition at v, there must
exist at least one set of (two or more) proposals whose resolution is modified by a feasible
payoff-improving trade within C. If multiple sets of such proposals exist, select one. Call
it P˜ . Consider any voter i ∈ C. Define P˜w(i) = {k ∈ P˜ | i is on the winning side for k ∈ P˜
post-trade and is on the losing side pre-trade} and P˜ l(i) = {k ∈ P˜ | i is on the losing side for
k ∈ P˜ post-trade and is on the winning side pre-trade}, and observe that P˜ = P˜w(i) ∪ P˜ l(i),
since, by selection of P˜ , trade changes the resolution of all proposals in P˜ . Because i ∈ C,
it must be the case that i strictly gains from the trade overall. Hence, even though the
two sets, P˜w(i)and P˜ l(i), may have different cardinality, by definition of improving trade,∑
k∈P˜w(i) x
k
i >
∑
k∈P˜l(i) x
k
i . Because all k ∈ P˜ are decided by minimal majority at v, one can
construct a blocking trade by reallocating a single vote within C on each k ∈ P˜ , and leaving
unchanged all vote holdings on the other proposals. Specifically, construct a trade such
that i receives one extra vote on all k ∈ P˜w(i), and gives away one vote on any k′ ∈ P˜ l(i)
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such that vk′i > 0. But then
σi
(
v′
)− σi(v)= ( ∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki v
′k
i +
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki v
′k
i
)
−
( ∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki v
k
i +
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki v
k
i
)
≥
∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki −
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki
> 0
The score of voter i has increased. Q.E.D.
An observation about this construction is key to understanding what follows. Voter i,
designated as the recipient of a vote for each proposal in P˜w(i) and, wherever possible,
as the source of the traded votes for proposals in P˜ l(i), is chosen arbitrarily and can be
any member of the blocking coalition. The trade is constructed to guarantee that i’s score
increases: for any arbitrary i ∈C, there exists a trade with such property.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: We construct an algorithm such that, starting at any initial vote
allocation v0, for any K, N , and z, there exists a finite sequence of blocking trades ending
in a stable vote allocation v∗.
At any step of the sequence with vote allocation v, denote by P̂(v) the set of proposals
that are not decided by a minimal majority at v, with |P̂(v)| ≤K. There are three cases to
consider. Case 0: there exists no blocking trade. Hence v is stable, and the theorem holds.
Case 1: there exists a blocking trade which changes the outcomes on some proposals that
are not decided by minimal majority at v. Case 2: all blocking trades at v change only
proposals that are decided by a minimal majority at v.
If we are in Case 1 at v, there exists at least one blocking trade that includes exchanging
pivotal votes on a non-empty subset of P̂(v). If there are multiple such trades, select one,
and call P̂(v) the set of non-minimal majority proposals at v whose resolution is modified
by the trade. Any outcome achieved by a blocking trade involving P̂(v) can always be
replicated by a blocking trade, (v v′), constructed so that, at v′, all proposals in P̂(v)
are decided by a minimal majority. Execute one such trade. This reduces the number of
proposals that are not decided by a minimal majority by |P̂(v)|> 0. Thus, |P̂(v′)|< |P̂(v)|.
At v′, again we can be in Case 0, Case 1, or Case 2.
If we are in Case 2 at v, then there exists a blocking coalition and a blocking trade for
that coalition, (v v′), that only changes proposals decided by minimal majority at v. If
there are multiple such coalitions, select one, and call it C. Assign to each voter an index
i ∈ {1    N}, and define i∗C to be the unique voter in C with the property that i∗C ≤ i for
all i ∈ C—that is, i∗C is the voter in C with the lowest index. By Lemma 1, we can find
a blocking trade for C such that σi∗C (v
′) > σi∗C (v), and such that the proposals involved
in the trade continue to be decided by minimal majority at v′. Execute that trade. At v′,
again we can be in Case 0, Case 1, or Case 2.
At any future step and vote allocation v, proceed as above. The algorithm defines a
sequence of blocking trades, or ends trade if no blocking trade exists. We claim that this
algorithm must end after a finite number of trades.
The logic is as follows. First, because |P̂(v)| ≤K <∞ and |P̂(v′)|< |P̂(v)|, we can only
be in Case 1 a finite number of times in the sequence. Thus, we only have to ensure that
we can be in Case 2 only a finite number of times. Consider voter 1. For voter 1, we know
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that whenever we are in Case 2 at step t, σ1(v′) > σ1(v) if 1 ∈ C, because 1 = i∗C , and
σ1(v
′) = σ1(v) if 1 /∈ C. Because 1’s score is a bounded function of v, this implies that 1
can be in at most a finite number of Case 2 blocking trades. From above, we also know
that 1 can be party to at most a finite number of Case 1 blocking trades. Hence, there is
a finite number of steps in the sequence that have a blocking trade with a coalition that
includes voter 1.
Next, consider voter 2. For voter 2, we know that σ2(v′) > σ2(v) whenever we are in
Case 2 and 1 /∈ C but 2 ∈ C, because 2 = i∗C . At any step of Case 2 where {12} ⊆ C, 2’s
score may possibly decrease because 1 = i∗C , but this can happen only a finite number of
times, because 1 can only be in a finite number of blocking trades in the sequence. At any
step of Case 2 where 2 /∈ C, 2’s vote holdings are unchanged, so 2’s score is unchanged.
Because 2’s score is bounded above, this implies that 2 can be in at most a finite number of
Case 2 blocking trades. And, from above, we also know that 2 can be involved in at most a
finite number of Case 1 blocking trades. Hence, there is a finite number of steps in the se-
quence that have a blocking trade involving voter 2. Extending the logic of this argument
to voters with indices i > 2, it follows that every voter can be in at most a finite number of
blocking trades in the sequence. Because there is a finite number of voters, each of whom
can be involved in only a finite number of blocking trades in the sequence, the sequence
can only have a finite number of steps, and must end at a stable vote allocation. Hence,
the set of Pivot stable allocations is non-empty. Q.E.D.
The result holds broadly. The only condition we impose is that all members of a trading
coalition must strictly benefit (myopically) from the trade. We do not restrict the size of
the coalition or the number of proposals affected by vote trades; we do not require that
trades be one-to-one or limited to pivotal votes. And yet we find that there is always—
for any number of voters and proposals, for any profile of separable preferences and
any initial vote allocation—a path of payoff-improving trades that leads to a stable vote
allocation. Note that because the theorem holds for any arbitrary selection of coalition
C , it holds, a fortiori, if we constrain allowable coalitions—for example, if we allow only
pairwise trades or impose some cohesion requirement on C. Any such constraint will
reduce the set of unstable vote allocations and strengthen the case for stability.
The theorem does not say that every trading path must converge to stability; rather, it
says that there always exists a trading path for which this is true. However, the existence
of one such path for any arbitrary starting allocation v0 allows us to identify a broad class
of selection rules R for which convergence to stability is guaranteed to occur in finite
time. Call Rr the family of all rules R such that, for all v ∈ V and for all (v v′) ∈ B(v),
R(vv′) > 0. That is, Rr is the family of all stochastic selection rules R that put positive
probability on any existing blocking trade. We can then state the following:10
COROLLARY 1: If R ∈Rr , then for all v0, K, N , and z, a Pivot-stable allocation of votes is
reached with probability 1 in finite time.
PROOF: For any vote allocation v, if v is stable, the result holds trivially; if not, denote
by L(v) the length of the shortest sequence of blocking trades, starting at v and ending
at some stable vote allocation v∗L(v). Let L= maxv∈V{L(v)}, which we know exists because
10The intuition is similar to a well-known result in the matching literature: in marriage markets, random
matching algorithms will eventually lead to a stable match (Roth and Vande Vate (1990)). Note, however, that
our environment is quite different, primarily because payoffs depend on the entire profile of vote allocations.
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V is a finite set and a stable vote allocation v∗ exists. Let r = min{R(vv′) | B(v) = ∅
and (v v′) ∈ B(v)} > 0, and let π = rL (where L is a power). Suppose the initial vote
allocation is v0. Then the probability that a stable allocation is reached in a sequence of
L or fewer trades from v0 is greater than or equal to π. Similarly, the probability that a
stable allocation is reached in a sequence of mL or fewer trades from v0 is greater than
or equal to
∑m
j=1(1 −π)j−1π = π 1−(1−π)
m
1−(1−π) = 1 − (1 −π)m → 1 as m→ ∞. Q.E.D.
No additional condition is required. As long as all trades have some chance of being
selected, the result holds: convergence to a stable allocation will occur in a finite number
of steps.
3.2. Pairwise Trading
Theorem 1 and its corollary tell us that vote trading will lead to stability for a large
class of selection rules, in arbitrary environments. But can we identify conditions un-
der which convergence is guaranteed for all selection rules? Riker and Brams (1973)
proposed a trading rule not unlike our Pivot algorithms—payoff-improving, myopic, en-
forceable trades—and conjectured that convergence to stability required limiting trades
to be pairwise. Theorem 1 shows that the conjecture is incorrect. And yet we show in this
section that restricting trade to be pairwise can lead to a stronger result. When comple-
mented with one intuitive additional condition, pairwise trading leads to stability along
all trading paths.
The additional condition excludes the trade of redundant votes—the gratuitous ex-
change of votes that have no effect. The condition is required to preserve the mono-
tonicity of the score function along the path of trade. Consider the following example:
EXAMPLE 3: Suppose v0 = (1    1). There are four proposals and five voters, and the
value matrix is shown in Table III.
At v0, proposals A, B, and D pass; proposal C fails. All proposals pass or fail by minimal
majority. Consider the following sequence of pairwise Pivot trades. At v0, voter 1 gives
one A vote and one D vote to 2, in exchange for one B vote and one C vote. The trade is
strictly payoff-improving for both traders because it alters the majority direction on A and
B; it does not alter the voting tally on C and D, on which 1 and 2 agree. At v1, proposal D
passes and all others fail. Voters 2 and 3 can block v1: voter 2 gives one A vote and one D
vote to 3, in exchange for one C and one B vote. The trade alters the majority on A and
C, and is payoff-improving for both voters; it does not affect the resolution of D and B,
on which the two voters agree. At v2, A, C, and D pass, and B fails. But v2 is not stable:
TABLE III
PAIRWISE PIVOT TRADES NEED NOT CONVERGE IF
REDUNDANT TRADES ARE POSSIBLE: AN EXAMPLE
1 2 3 4 5
A 1 −2 2 1 −1
B −2 1 2 −1 1
C 1 3 −1 −3 −1
D 2 1 1 −2 −1
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voters 3 and 4 can trade and raise their myopic payoff. Voter 3 gives one D vote and one
A vote to 4, in exchange for one B and one C vote. The majority changes on B and D, but
not on A and C, on which the two voters agree. At v3, A, B, and C pass, and D fails. But
voters 1 and 4 can block v3: voter 1 gives one C and one B vote to 4, in exchange for one
D and one A vote. The trade is strictly payoff-improving because it alters the majority on
C and D in the direction both traders prefer; it does not alter the majority on A and B,
on which the two traders agree. This last trade, however, has brought the vote allocation
back to v0. The sequence of trades can then be repeated into a never-ending cycle.
In Example 3, all Pivot trades are pairwise and all proposals, at any step on the path
of trade, are decided by minimal majority. Yet, it is readily verified that traders’ scores
at times decrease, and vote allocations cycle. The problem comes from vote trades on
proposals on which the traders agree. These redundant trades have no effect on payoffs,
and thus a voter can trade away a vote on a high-value proposal for a vote on a lower value
proposal: the trade has no immediate effect, but the voter’s score declines. The declines
in score make cycles possible.
To guarantee convergence to a stable vote allocation, we need to rule out redundant
trades. What this means exactly is formalized in the following two definitions.
DEFINITION 9: (v v′′) is a reduction of (v v′) if P(v′′) = P(v′), ki (v v′) = 0 ⇒
ki (v v
′′) = 0 for all i, k, and for all i, k, ki (v v′) ≥ 0 ⇒ ki (v v′) ≥ ki (v v′′), with
ki (v v
′) > ki (v v
′′) for some i, k.
DEFINITION 10: Consider a blocking trade (v v′). We say that (v v′) is a minimal
blocking trade if there does not exist a reduction of (v v′).
Loosely speaking, minimality rules out two kinds of trades: if trade (v v′) does not
change the outcome of proposal k, then no votes are traded on k; and if trade (v v′)
does change the outcome of proposal k, then k is decided by minimal majority at v′. It is
straightforward to show that if v is not a stable allocation, then the set of minimal blocking
trades is non-empty.
We can then state the following:
THEOREM 2: If trades are restricted to be pairwise and minimal, then a Pivot-stable allo-
cation of votes exists for all v0, K, N , z, and R.
As in the case of Theorem 1, the proof builds on the score function. It shows that,
in the streamlined environment of Theorem 2, traders’ scores can decrease only if trade
occurs on non-minimal majority proposals. But by minimality, any such trade must bring
the proposals to minimal majority, and thus the number of trades on which scores can fall
must be finite. Because the score function is bounded and the number of voters is finite, it
then follows that the number of trades must be finite and bounded as well. And this must
be true on any path of trade determined by any choice rule R. A formal proof is in the
Appendix.
Example 3 shows that, without minimality, pairwise trade is not sufficient to guarantee
convergence to stability for all selection rules. But it is also the case that, without the
restriction to pairwise trading, minimality is not sufficient either. Consider the following
example:
EXAMPLE 4: Table IV reports the value matrix. The initial vote allocation is v0 =
(11    1).
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TABLE IV
MINIMAL PIVOT TRADES NEED NOT CONVERGE IF
COALITIONAL TRADES ARE POSSIBLE: AN EXAMPLE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A 2 −1 −1 −1 1 1 1
B −1 2 −1 −1 1 1 1
C −1 −1 2 −1 1 1 1
D −1 −1 −1 2 1 1 1
At v0, all proposals pass by minimal majority, and ui(v0)= −1 for i = {1234}. Con-
sider a coalition composed of such voters, and the following coalition trade: voter 1 gives
her A vote to voter 2, in exchange for 2’s B vote; voter 3 gives her C vote to voter 4, in
exchange for 4’s D vote. At v1, all proposals fail and ui(v1)= 0 for all coalition members.
For all, the trade is strictly improving. The vote allocation v1 is not Pivot stable: voters 1
and 2 can block v1 by trading back their respective votes on A and B, reaching outcome
P(v2)=AB, and enjoying a strictly positive increase in payoffs: uj(v2)= 1 for j = {12}.
At v2, us(v2) = −2 for s = {34}, but 3 and 4 can block v2, trade back their votes on C
and D, and obtain a strict improvement in their payoff: P(v3)=ABCD, and us(v3)= −1
for s = {34}. The sequence of trades has generated a cycle: v3 = v0, an allocation that is
blocked by coalition C = {1234}, etc. Hence, for R that selects the blocking coalitions
in the order described, no Pivot-stable allocation of votes can be reached.
We can rephrase the observation in terms of each voter’s score: although all trades are
strictly payoff-improving, the first coalition trade, from v0 to v1, lowers the score of all
traders involved from 5 to 4. The two successive trades raise the traders’ scores back to 5,
one pair at a time, but the initial decline makes a cycle possible.
Note that all trades in Example 4 are minimal. And yet, a decline in scores can accom-
pany a profitable trade because of the trading externalities present within the coalition: a
coalition member can engage in a vote exchange that by itself would not be profitable and
that causes a decline in score because she benefits from the other members’ trades. When
trade is pairwise and minimal, all trades must be advantageous to all active traders, and
this cause of possible cycles is excluded.
We conclude this section with one final remark on the technique used to prove and
illustrate our results. We have relied repeatedly on the score function because it makes
transparent the source of the gain from blocking trades and the built-in ceiling in such
possible gains and trades. The score function is a cardinal measure of the potential value
of voters’ vote holdings, but it is important to stress that the reliance on a cardinal mea-
sure is for convenience only. The logic is fully ordinal: changing all intensities xki in any
arbitrary fashion that preserves all ordinal rankings has no impact on any of our results.
3.3. Properties of Pivot-Stable Outcomes
Following Theorem 1, a Pivot-stable vote allocation always exists. When trade comes to
an end, the outcome of the vote is realized. Do outcomes reached via vote trading possess
desirable welfare properties?
We define the following:
DEFINITION 11: An outcome P(v) is a Pivot-stable outcome if v is a Pivot-stable vote
allocation.
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For any fixed K, N , and z, we denote V∗ the set of all Pivot-stable vote allocations,
and P(V∗) the set of all stable outcomes reachable with positive probability through a
Pivot algorithm. If P(V∗) is a singleton, we use the notation P(V∗) to denote the unique
element of P(V∗).11
We find the following:
THEOREM 3: All Pivot-stable outcomes must be in the Pareto set, for all v0, K, N , and z.
PROOF: We know from Theorem 1 that a Pivot-stable outcome exists. Regardless of
the history of previous trades, if the outcome is Pareto dominated, then the coalition
of the whole can always reach a Pareto superior outcome and has a profitable deviation.
But then the allocation corresponding to the Pareto-dominated outcome cannot be Pivot-
stable. Q.E.D.
If no restriction on coalition formation is imposed, all Pivot-stable outcomes must be
Pareto optimal. Coupled with Theorem 1, Theorem 3 teaches us that vote trading can
always reach a Pareto optimal outcome (contrary to earlier conjectures). But note that the
result relies on being able to form the coalition of the whole. Thus, the result holds for any
coalitional restriction that does not interfere with the coalition of the whole, but does not
hold if such coalition cannot form. Riker and Brams’s (1973) “paradox of vote trading”
is a well-known example where pairwise trades only are possible, and the outcome they
identified (which would be Pivot-stable if only pairwise trades were allowed) is not Pareto
optimal.12
A second property generally viewed as desirable in voting environments is the ability
to reach the Condorcet winner: the outcome that is preferred by a majority of voters to
every other outcome. The Condorcet winner need not exist, and a voting system is said
to satisfy Condorcet consistency if it uniquely selects the Condorcet winner whenever it
does exist. Is Pivot stability Condorcet consistent?13
Because the Condorcet winner implicitly assumes unweighted voting, in the remainder
of this section we restrict the analysis to environments where v0 = (1    1). The main
result is negative: vote trading may lead to stable outcomes that differ from the Condorcet
winner.
PROPOSITION 2: If K > 2 and N > 3, there exist z such that k is the Condorcet winner
but there exists k′ = k such that k′ ∈ P(V∗).
PROOF: Consider the environment in Table V with v0 = (1    1), K = 3 and N = 5,
where P(v0)=ABC is the Condorcet winner.
Consider the following set of trades. At v0, voter 2 gives a B vote to 3, in exchange
for an A vote; at the new vote allocation, P(v1)= C. However, v1 is not stable: it can be
blocked by voters 4 and 5, trading votes on A and B so that P(v2)=ABC . But v2 is again
not stable: it can be blocked by 1 and 3, trading votes on B and C so that P(v3) = A.
Allocation v3 is stable, and thus A is a Pivot-stable outcome along this path of trade. To
11Note that uniqueness of P(V∗) does not imply that V∗ is a singleton. There can be multiple Pivot-stable
vote allocations, all leading to the same outcome.
12It is also easy to construct cases in which a stable outcome reached via pairwise trade is in fact Pareto
optimal. The general point is that with pairwise trade, Pareto optimality is not guaranteed.
13Utilitarian welfare criteria are not appropriate here because they depend on cardinal preferences, and
thus can vary for fixed ordinal rankings.
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TABLE V
PREFERENCE PROFILE SUCH THAT A PIVOT-STABLE
OUTCOME IS NOT THE CONDORCET WINNER
1 2 3 4 5
A 4 −7 1 −1 4
B 1 1 −4 4 −1
C −3 4 2 −2 2
see that v3 is stable, notice that no B votes can be traded because voter 3 has a majority of
B votes and ranks winning B higher than winning A and C. Thus, at v3, the proposals on
which trade can possibly occur are only two, A and C, and the possible outcomes are A
(the outcome at v3) or C. Voter 3 cannot trade votes away because she has 0 votes on both
A and C. As for the other voters, either they do not want to trade because they prefer A
to C (voters 1, 4, and 5) or only hold losing votes and cannot trade (voter 2). Finally, note
that although a majority prefers ABC = P(v0) to A= P(v3), the no-trade allocation v0 is
not stable.
The example can be generalized to an arbitrary number of voters and proposals. Main-
taining first K = 3, we can add to the example any even number of voters such that, at v3,
half of them win on all proposals (i.e., prefer A to pass, and B and C to fail) and half of
them lose on all proposals (i.e., prefer A to fail, and B and C to pass). Adding such vot-
ers cannot induce any further trade at v3. As long as their preferences are such that both
types of voters rank ABC above both outcome B and outcome C, ABC remains the Con-
dorcet winner. And yet P(v3)=A remains Pivot-stable. We can then extend the example
to arbitrary K > 3 by adding proposals such that for each additional proposal, k′, voters
i= 1    N − 1 are all in favor of k′ passing, and furthermore, zk′i > xAi +xBi +xCi > 0 for
i = 1    N − 1. This guarantees that no trade involving these additional proposals will
take place, and P(v3)=A remains Pivot-stable. Q.E.D.
Pivot-stability not only fails to satisfy Condorcet consistency; by immediate extension,
Proposition 2 implies that Pivot-stability is inconsistent with any solution concept that is
itself Condorcet consistent, that is, that uniquely selects the Condorcet winner when it
exists.
The negative result in Proposition 2 does not extend to the special cases of K = 2 or
N = 3. The two propositions below make this point. They are stated separately because
the two results stem from very different logic.
PROPOSITION 3: If N = 3, then for all K and z, if the Condorcet winner exists, P(V∗) is a
singleton, and is the Condorcet winner.
PROOF: See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 4: If K = 2, then for allN and z, P(V∗) is a singleton and is the Condorcet
winner, if the Condorcet winner exists. If P(V∗) = P(v0), a majority prefers P(V∗) to P(v0).
PROOF: See the Appendix. Q.E.D.
With N = 3, the result follows immediately. From Park (1967) and Kadane (1972), we
know that the Condorcet winner, if it exists, must coincide with the no-trade outcome.
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If N = 3, a pair of voters constitutes a majority, and thus if v0 delivers the Condorcet
winner, it cannot be blocked. But Proposition 4 does not follow as directly, because trade
is indeed possible. Rather, its proof highlights that in the case of two proposals, trading
via the Pivot algorithm can reach only two possible outcomes—the no-trade outcome and
its complement. This effectively partitions all voters into two groups, with opposite pref-
erences between the no-trade outcome and its complement. Differences in preferences
ranking over other outcomes within each of these two groups are irrelevant because such
outcomes are unreachable. Over reachable outcomes, preferences within each group are
perfectly aligned. The scenario thus effectively reduces to a contest between two alterna-
tives, the no-trade outcome and its complement, whose resolution is fully determined by
which side holds more votes. In contrast, when there are more than two proposals, all 2K
possible outcomes are reachable in principle, and it is not possible to partition the voters
into two groups with opposite preferences over exactly two reachable outcomes. Hence
the logic of the proof of Proposition 4 breaks down for K > 2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a general theoretical framework for studying vote trading in com-
mittees. It starts from two essential features: (1) a notion of stability: a stable vote alloca-
tion is such that no strict payoff-improving vote trade exists; and (2) a class of vote trading
algorithms—Pivot algorithms—that define dynamic paths from initially unstable vote al-
locations to stable vote allocations. The model has three key assumptions. First, proposals
are binary and preferences are separable across proposals: a voter’s preferred resolution
of proposal A does not depend on the resolution of proposal B. Second, voting takes
place proposal by proposal: voters can trade votes simultaneously on multiple proposals
without constraint, but each vote is specialized by proposal. Finally, as in the canonical
model of economic exchange, each vote trade is a transfer of a property right among the
trading parties: trades cannot be reversed unilaterally, and votes can be re-traded.
The basic framework delivers answers to core questions of existence, Pareto optimality,
and Condorcet consistency. The central finding of the paper is a general existence re-
sult: there always exists a sequence of payoff-improving trades that leads to a stable vote
allocation in finite time, from any initial distribution of votes, for any number of voters
and proposals, for any separable preferences, and for any conditions on feasible trading
coalitions. Furthermore, if all blocking trades are selected with positive probability, then
trading is guaranteed to converge to a stable vote allocation with probability 1. In the ab-
sence of restrictions on feasible trading coalitions, outcomes corresponding to stable vote
allocations must be in the Pareto set, but in general, there is no guarantee that trading
will result in the Condorcet winner when it exists.
There are a number of interesting directions to pursue, using this framework as a start-
ing point. First, one could extend the myopic trading algorithms to allow for farsighted
behavior where voters correctly anticipate the consequences of a trade they engage in,
trade which can trigger future trades by other voters. Some initial results were reported
in Casella and Palfrey (2018a).
Second, the framework can be generalized to allow for voting rules other than simple
majority rule, such as qualified majority rule or the existence of veto players. The basic
formal concepts such as the definitions of blocking coalitions, blocking trades, stability,
Pivot algorithms, and so forth would remain unchanged, although different voting rules
would imply different blocking trades.
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A third, related extension would consider different restrictions on the vote trading pro-
cess. Restrictions could be embodied in the contract through which votes are exchanged,
for example limiting the extent of re-trading to which a vote is subject. Whether such
restrictions would favor or hamper convergence to stability is an open question. Alterna-
tively, restrictions could be imposed on the coalitions that can organize vote trades. We
have studied explicitly two possibilities only: unlimited coalitional trading (i.e., no restric-
tion at all on the coalitions that can organize a trade), and, for some additional results,
pairwise trading (i.e., any coalition of exactly two voters). But in some committees or legis-
latures, norms or party ties may limit which coalitions can form. Restricting coalitions will
not affect the main existence theorem because restrictions make blocking more difficult,
but could affect the properties of Pivot-stable outcomes.
A fourth possible direction concerns agenda setting and agenda manipulation. In the
model studied in this paper, the set of binary issues is exogenously given, but in prac-
tice, the proposals up for vote are typically the outcome of an agenda formation process.
One can imagine different ways to introduce such a process into the model. In one such
approach, an agenda setter or committee chair may have the power to bundle propos-
als. Agenda setting in the form of bundling introduces a different perspective on model-
ing logrolling in committees. Considering the agenda formation process would move the
analysis in the direction of bargaining models of legislative decision making (Baron and
Ferejohn (1989)) suggesting a non-cooperative game approach, in contrast to the stability
approach pursued here.
Finally, a different but important question is how to incorporate uncertainty in the
model. Our framework has no formal inclusion of uncertainty. In a companion paper
(Casella and Palfrey (2018b)), we reported findings from an experiment that reproduces
the framework studied here, but where trades are proposed and executed by the voters
in the experiment, as opposed to being ruled by an algorithm. We find some hoarding of
votes on high-value proposals, perhaps as a hedge against adverse vote trading by others.
This suggests a sensitivity to the strategic uncertainty voters face: it is difficult to predict
future vote trades that might be triggered by a current vote trade. More traditional mod-
eling of uncertainty using a Bayesian game approach could be explored, incorporating
private information either about one’s own preferences or about an unknown state of the
world that affects everyone’s welfare, as in Condorcet jury models.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
THEOREM 2: If trades are restricted to be pairwise and minimal, then a Pivot-stable allo-
cation of votes exists for all v0, K, N , z, and R.
PROOF: We begin by supposing, as in Lemma 1, that at some v, all blocking trades
involve only proposals that are decided by minimal majority. Then, by minimality of the
trades, no more than one vote is ever traded on any given proposal (although trades could
involve bundles of proposals). If i does not trade, then σi(v′)= σi(v), by construction. If
i does trade, recall the notation used on the proof of Lemma 1 and call P˜ the set of
proposals on which i trades, P˜l(i) the subset i wins pre-trade and loses post-trade, and
P˜w(i) the subset i loses pre-trade and wins post-trade. By minimality, the resolution of
all proposals on which votes are traded must change. Hence P˜l(i) ∪ P˜w(i) = P˜ . Although
the two sets may have different cardinality, by definition of pairwise improving trade,
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k∈P˜l(i) x
k
i <
∑
k∈P˜w(i) x
k
i . Since a single vote is traded on each proposal, we have
σi
(
v′
)− σi(v)= ( ∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki v
′k
i +
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki v
′k
i
)
−
( ∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki v
k
i +
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki v
k
i
)
≥
∑
k∈P˜w(i)
xki −
∑
k∈P˜l(i)
xki
> 0
The score of voter i has increased.
Hence, if i trades, σi(v′) > σi(v). At any future step, either there is no trade and the
Pivot-stable allocation has been reached, or there is trade, and thus there are two voters
i and j whose score increases. The scores of all voters executing pairwise minimal trades
on proposals decided by minimal majority must increase.
Suppose now that at v, some blocking minimal trades involve proposals that are not
decided by minimal majority. Call the set of such proposals P̂(v). On such proposals, no
single vote is pivotal, and hence trades must concern more than one vote. As a result,
although
∑
k∈P˜l(i) x
k
i <
∑
k∈P˜w(i) x
k
i must continue to hold by definition of payoff-improving
trade, σi(v′) < σi(v) is possible (as in Example 2 in the text). But, by minimality, all pro-
posals on which votes are traded must be decided by minimal majority after trade. Hence
|P̂(v′)| < |P̂(v)|, and since |P̂(v)| ≤ K < ∞, blocking trades on non-minimal majority
proposals can happen at most a finite number of times. Hence, the logic of the proof of
Theorem 1 applies here as well: for any R, the number of trades on non-minimal majority
proposals must be finite, and because score functions are bounded and the number of
voters is finite, so must be the number of trades on minimal majority proposals. Hence,
trading always ends after a finite number of steps, and a Pivot-stable allocation of votes
always exists. Because the argument in the proof makes no restriction on R, the result
holds for all R. Q.E.D.
To prove Propositions 3 and 4, we exploit a result from the literature,14 restated in the
following lemma.
LEMMA 2: For any K, N , and z, the Condorcet winner, if it exists, can only be P(v0).
PROOF: On any single proposal, the majority of the votes at v0 reflect the preferences
of the majority of the voters. For any number of proposals m ∈ {1    K}, consider some
outcome P(v0m) obtained by deciding m proposals in the direction favored by the mi-
nority at v0, and the remainder K − m in the direction favored by the majority. Now
consider an alternative outcome, P(v0 (m− 1)), that is the same as P(v0m) except that
only m−1 of those m proposals are decided in the direction favored by the minority at v0.
By construction, P(v0 (m− 1)) must be majority-preferred to P(v0m). Hence, for any
m ∈ {1    K}, P(v0m) cannot be the Condorcet winner. But by varying m between 1
and K, and considering all such P(v0m) we span all possible outcomes other than P(v0).
Hence, if the Condorcet winner exists, it can only be P(v0). Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 3: If N = 3, then for all K and z, if the Condorcet winner exists, P(V∗) is a
singleton, and is the Condorcet winner.
14See Park (1967) and Kadane (1972).
650 A. CASELLA AND T. PALFREY
PROOF: By Lemma 2, if the Condorcet winner exists, it can only be P(v0). But then
with N = 3, no trade can take place: if the Condorcet winner exists, v0 cannot be blocked.
Thus, P(V∗) equals P(v0) and is the Condorcet winner. Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 4: If K = 2, then for allN and z, P(V∗) is a singleton and is the Condorcet
winner, if the Condorcet winner exists. If P(V∗) = P(v0), a majority prefers P(V∗) to P(v0).
PROOF: Suppose, with no loss of generality, that P(v0) = AB—both proposals pass.
All members of a blocking coalition must strictly gain from the trade. Hence, any blocking
trade must be such that both proposals change direction, because pivotal voters trading
away their vote on one proposal must be compensated by moving to a winning position on
the other proposal. It follows that along any path of trades, the only two possible outcomes
are AB, at t = 024    , and ∅—both proposals fail—at t = 135    . We know from
Theorem 1 that P(V∗) is not empty. Hence P(V∗)⊆ {AB∅}. Partition all voters into two
sets of voters CAB and C∅ where i ∈ CAB ⇐⇒ AB i ∅, that is, CAB is composed of all
voters who prefer AB to ∅; and i ∈ C∅ ⇐⇒ ∅ i AB, that is, C∅ is composed of all voters
who prefer ∅ to AB.15 The two sets have cardinality NAB and N∅, respectively. Note that
blocking coalitions can only be formed within each set: for any path of trade, all members
of a blocking coalition at t even must belong to C∅, and at t odd must belong to CAB.
Suppose first NAB >N∅. Then at v0, CAB holds a total of NAB votes on each proposal, and
C∅ a total of N∅ votes, again on each proposal. Since NAB > N∅, on each proposal voters
in CAB initially hold more votes than voters in C∅. Since blocking trades must always
take place within either CAB or C∅, this relation is true at every step of the trading path.
But then ∅ cannot be a Pivot-stable outcome, because at any vote allocation vt where
P(vt)= ∅, vt is blocked by CAB.
To see this, notice that because P(v0) = AB and NAB > N∅, it cannot be the case that
all voters in CAB prefer ∅ to A or A would have failed at v0. Similarly, it cannot be the
case that all voters in CAB prefer ∅ to B. Thus, there must be at least one voter in CAB who
prefers B to ∅ and at least one voter in CAB who prefers A to ∅. It follows that CAB can
always block vt by giving all of its B votes to a voter in CAB who prefers B to ∅ and giving
all of its A votes to a voter in CAB who prefers A to ∅. Because such a blocking trade is
always possible, at any vt reachable from v0, it then follows that P(V∗) = AB. Identical
logic shows that if NAB <N∅, then P(V∗)= ∅. Because N is odd, NAB =N∅ is impossible.
Thus, P(V∗) must always be a singleton.
By Lemma 2, only AB can be the Condorcet winner. Because P(v0)=AB, it must be
the case that AB is majority-preferred to both A and B, and is the Condorcet winner
if it is also majority-preferred to ∅, that is, if NAB > N∅. But we just established that if
NAB > N∅, P(V∗) = AB. Hence, if the Condorcet winner exists, P(V∗) is the Condorcet
winner. If NAB < N∅, the Condorcet winner does not exist. In such a case, P(V∗) = ∅,
and, since NAB < N∅, P(V∗) is majority-preferred to P(v0), concluding the proof of the
proposition. Q.E.D.
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